In Syria, the United States can help rebuild while displacing Russian influence

The fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad creates a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape the balance of power in the Middle East. The weapons that American policymakers can use to achieve this rebalancing are not bombs, but trade.

Washington needs a plan to create conditions for future American investments to stabilize Syria, and to ensure that Russia does not regain a foothold. If policymakers can work smartly and strategically with American companies and other partners, the United States will be able to weaken Russian influence in Syria and Vladimir Putin’s plans for power projection in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa.

It is essential for the United States to act now. While Russia’s position in Syria has weakened, it is now likely to redouble its efforts to strengthen its position in the country. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a signatory to the UN resolution defining the post-Assad transition, Russia has diplomatic influence in the negotiations. Russia has not completely evacuated its military bases in Syria. Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s current de facto leader, noted the existence of “deep strategic” interests between Russia and Syria.

Russia is likely to try to benefit from its trade relations. After Russia’s military intervention in Syria in late 2015 to rescue Assad, Russian companies (along with the paramilitary group Wagner, now renamed AfricaCorp) gained access to Syria’s resources, including energy, phosphates and telecommunications. Russia is expected to lose billions in investments in Syria, in addition to loans provided to the Assad regime.

Any American plan to confront Russia must begin with sanctions. Washington has surrounded the Assad regime within a narrow network of various sanctions. It will take years to cancel them all, but discussion is now underway to issue exemptions and licenses to encourage economic development and foreign investment in Syria. On January 6, the Treasury Department issued additional sanctions relief. If early waivers are issued on humanitarian grounds, US officials must ensure that Russia cannot take advantage of any loopholes in the sanctions regime, including through the use of shell companies and other third parties that may be difficult to trace.

The United States must also be proactive and go beyond sanctions. Washington can do this by empowering Ukrainians and other partners to help rebuild Syria. In fact, President Volodymyr Zelensky has already expressed his desire to do so. The United States can respect the current sanctions regime while helping to determine what assistance the Ukrainians and other partners need to operate in Syria in a way that enables them and prevents Russia from entering.

Until recently, Russia was Syria’s largest supplier of wheat, grain that Russia largely stole from Ukraine. With the fall of Assad, Russian supplies were suspended. The United States, in partnership with American companies, must ensure that Ukrainian wheat reaches Syria. Later, it would have to expand this option to include other business interests, such as telecommunications, closing the doors to Russia.

Finally, the United States can build a better public messaging campaign, perhaps also with the help of the private sector, to highlight what America and its partners are doing to help Syria. In previous years, America often did not designate humanitarian aid for fear of Assad’s retaliation. The United States did not care about obtaining credit; It gave priority to helping the Syrian people. Now is a good time to also start getting credit.

No one should have any illusions. Helping Syria will be very difficult. But the United States has been the largest provider of humanitarian aid to Syria over the years, providing more than $17 billion in humanitarian aid since 2011. If the United States succeeds in getting aid to Syria under Assad’s control, it could certainly go further. Beyond Aid Now that Assad is gone, Russia (and Iran) is losing influence. Senior Russian officials often travel to foreign countries accompanied by trade delegations. Moscow realizes the importance of trade relations in politics. The United States can beat Putin at his own game.

American credibility is at stake. Moreover, failure to support Syria will cost the United States more in Ukraine. US policymakers have long said that Russia should not be allowed to profit from Assad’s war crimes. Over the years, Russian officials have cried crocodile tears over the humanitarian suffering in Syria while Putin helped Assad bomb civilians. Moscow has been able to repeat its crimes in Ukraine on a larger scale. This will continue unless the price for Russia becomes high enough.

The Russians are currently betting that Washington will simply abandon the Middle East, and that the United States will lose face around the world if Moscow is proven right. If Russia strengthens its commercial presence in Syria, it will use the economic gains to fund its war efforts in Ukraine, which would likely increase costs for the West, because it would need to give Ukraine more aid in response. Moscow will also use its presence in Syria to build its influence throughout the region.

Putin does not want peace for the world, he wants chaos. Russia has already succeeded in undermining global trade and destabilizing economies and systems to the benefit of its power. Putin began the largest armed conflict on European soil since World War II when he invaded Ukraine. There is no claim now that the Ukraine war is an isolated conflict.

Yes, the Syrian people are the ones who must build their own future. However, the stability of that future will be much more secure with the help of the world’s dominant economic superpower. The United States has a great opportunity to restore its influence throughout the Middle East by resisting Moscow’s attempts to install itself at the center of the new world order. Allowing Russian hegemony in Syria will only lead to more chaos and war.

Anna Borshchevskaya is the Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and the author of “Putin’s War in Syria: Russian Foreign Policy and the Price of America’s Absence.”