The European Union has real influence to confront Trump’s introductory threats

Much at stake in the negotiations conducted by European Union Trade Commissioner Marus Sevkovic this week in Washington. If it fails, the United States and the European Union can be allocated for a devastating series of revenge that will harm work, innovation and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

As the former general manager of the European Union Trading and the former US ambassador to the European Union, we have often crossed swords, as each of us tried to promote the interests of our government in the failed efforts in the end to negotiate the free trade agreement from 2014 to 2017. But we unite today In our objection to the Trump administration’s unjustified threat to the definitions of European Union’s exports to build trade and a misunderstanding the ability of the bloc to defend itself.

It is clear that President Trump believes that the European Union is treating America very badly in trade and that the US trade deficit towards the European Union is evidence of this. He has repeatedly claimed that the American trade deficit is between $ 300 and 350 billion dollars. The trade deficit in the goods is about 150 billion euros, but America runs about 100 billion euros in the service trade, which means that the total trade deficit is about 50 billion euros – not enormous compared to the total via trade trade and is already smaller than the American trade deficit with China.

However, the trade deficit is not evidence of “fraud” by other countries; It is largely a reflection of macroeconomic factors, including the lack of savings and excessive spending in the United States, and not investing in Europe.

Trump has repeatedly mentioned that the European Union is still almost closed to the American export and that the American market is still completely open to its exports. The average account of applied definitions is 2.7 percent for the United States and 2 percent for the European Union. But the most feasible measure is the average rate of tariffs: this measure takes the average applied duties and weights of its own by the share represented by each of the total imports. This tariff is 1.5 percent for the United States and 1.3 meters of the European Union. However, the debate about customs tariff rates ultimately is that the rates are already low (except for some tariff peaks).

It is true that the European Union market is still protected by non -sharp tariff barriers in some critical sectors, especially agriculture. These sectors have been the main source of friction in the past, including the agreement we tried to reach. But the United States is not a saint. The Trump administration has comfortably failed to identify important American protection in many areas, such as public purchases, marine services, communications, and yes, also agriculture. The European Union has tried repeatedly in urging the United States to open these sectors as part of the wider market opening deals.

Trump often indicates that the European Union tariff of 10 percent on the US imported cars has much exceeded 2.5 percent on cars from Europe. What failed to mention it comfortably is that the United States imposes a 25 percent tariff on lights of light from the European Union, while the European Union rate is only 10 percent. More importantly, it is doubtful whether the highest tariff rate on American cars explains why European consumers do not buy more American cars; The most likely reason is that these cars are not perfectly suitable for the needs of European consumers.

It seems that the Trump administration believes that Europe, including the European Union, is weak and divided and thus unable to defend itself. The president often said that commercial wars are “great and easy to win.” While it is right that trade represents a much greater percentage of GDP of Europe compared to the United States, its conclusion is wrong.

The European Union is not a great power in the traditional sense, but it still has great power in the field of foreign trade. It is important that the mass now has more powerful commercial tools, including revenge for unjustified tariff threats, than it was a few years ago.

One of the weapons in the European Union’s arsenal is the tool of anti -liver, which entered into force at the end of 2023. This legislation allows the European Union to respond to the efforts of a third country to force the European Union to prevent, amend, amend, or adopt a specific act by the bloc or a member state. The coercion of the European Union can be considered a threat of customs tariffs to drop its definitions unilaterally, or to cancel or fail to impose major legislation against American digital platforms, as it justifies the use of legislation.

The European Union’s Arch Control tool also allows targeting specific individuals and companies-such as Elon Musk and Tesla-which behaves on behalf of the United States government. While the law requires the European Commission to transfer implementation measures to obtain the approval of the majority qualified by member states – it is recognized that this is a quick process – Washington should not assume that this is unreasonable.

Another powerful tool in the European Union arsenal is the international purchasing tool. This allows the European Commission to restrict access to companies other than European Union countries in public purchasing tenders in the European Union when these countries exercise restrictions on their public purchasing markets. Since America restricts such access to several material methods, the European Union may be looking to reduce the access of American companies to a 2 trillion euros market.

There is a rich list of other measures that the European Union can take that exceeds revenge that exceeds the mass pin that was applied in only three weeks in 2018 against Kentucky Bourbon, and Harley Defison in Wisconsin. Other measures can be imagined against Republican countries, including customs tariffs on beef and restricting the provision of American services to Europe.

Nothing would prevent the European Union from imposing “outside” measures such as the tax on American tourists visiting Europe. Since the threats of customs tariffs lead the American withdrawal from the multilateral agreement on international taxes, some European Union countries may restore digital taxes on American platforms. The effect of European Union measures will be strengthened if the mass will join Canada, Mexico and Japan in an alliance to exchange information and coordinate revenge.

Negotiations are usually better than strength display. During Trump’s first period, the European Union managed to avoid US tariffs by providing Trump’s “deal” that he published as a great victory: the European Commission will buy more heading up and that the market operators, not the European Commission, make purchase decisions that have not been left comfortably. More importantly, European Commission President Jean -Claude Jonker and Trump agreed to work on a zero tariff for industrial goods. Despite the mandate, which is still valid today, which was presented by the Cabinet of the European Union to the European Commission, this negotiation has never said that the United States wanted to add agriculture, which was not mentioned in the joint statement.

Perhaps this performance is possible. Perhaps there is a way for the European Union to make some concessions, including automatic definitions.

It is better to have a serious discussion about how the United States and the European Union can win together by opening its markets and focusing on the real threat, which comes from China. But if you are sitting in the West West Salon where your former partner believes this might make it better to have a pistol loaded on the table – and show that the room is full of bullets.

Jean -Luke Demarte served as the Director General of the European Commission Trading from 2011 to 2019. Anthony Gardner worked as an American ambassador to the European Union from 2014 to 2017.